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More Than a “Quick Glimpse of the Life”: 
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Evidence and Death Sentencing 
 
by JEROME DEISE* AND RAYMOND PATERNOSTER** 
I. Introduction 
In Kelly v. California and Zamudio v. California, the United 
States Supreme Court refused certiorari in two cases involving the use 
of victim impact evidence (“VIE”) in the penalty phase of a capital 
trial.1  In capital cases, victim impact evidence consists of testimony 
about the victim and the victim’s life presented by family members or 
friends of the murder victim to the sentencing body.  The testimony, 
usually provided by live in-court testimony, consists of information 
about how valuable the victim’s life was, what the victim contributed 
to their community and family, how much they are loved and will be 
missed by family members, how difficult life has been in the absence 
of the victim, and at times a direct or indirect statement as to the 
penalty the family would like to see imposed on the offender.2  
Essentially, victim impact testimony provides the sentencer with 
information about the impact that the victim’s death had, has, and 
will continue to have on those left behind in the wake of the killing.  
 
* Professor of law and Director of the University of Maryland School of Law’s Trial 
Advocacy Program.  The authors wish to acknowledge the generous and patient support 
of our outstanding library research liaison, Nathan Robertson, Director of Information 
Policy and Management, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. 
** Professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University 
of Maryland. Ray Paternoster would like to thank the Department of Criminology for 
providing research funds to conduct the experiment discussed in this article. 
1.  Kelly v. California, 555 U.S. 1020 (2008), denying cert. to People v. Zamudio, 43 
Cal. 4th 327 (2008) and People v. Kelly, 42 Cal. 4th 763 (2007). 
 2.  Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sentence Recommendations in 
Capital Trials, 41 B.C. L. REV. 517 (2000); Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A 
Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 143 (1999) (hereinafter Through the Past Darkly); Wayne A. Logan, Victim Impact 
Evidence in Federal Capital Trials, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 5 (2007). 
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The victim in Kelly, Sarah Weir, was nineteen years old.  The content 
of the VIE in her case was familiar, but its delivery took on a new 
form.  As described by Justice Stevens in his dissent from denial of 
certiorari in the Kelly case, the testimony consisted of the following: 
 
The prosecution played a 20-minute video 
consisting of a montage of still photographs and video 
footage documenting Weir’s life from her infancy until 
shortly before she was killed.  The video was narrated 
by the victim’s mother with soft music playing in the 
background, and it showed scenes of her swimming, 
horseback riding, and attending school and social 
functions with her family and friends.  The video 
ended with a view of her grave marker and footage of 
people riding horseback in Alberta, Canada—the 
“kind of heaven” in which her mother said she 
belonged.3 
 
In Zamudio, which involved the killing of a husband and wife, 
the VIE consisted of testimony from two of the victims’ daughters 
and two grandchildren.  In the testimony of one of the daughters, the 
prosecution played a video, which contained more than one hundred 
photographs of the victims from their childhood to the present.  The 
pictures revealed the couple raising their children, the husband’s 
service in the military, holiday celebrations, vacations, and family 
events, among others.  The last three photographs showed each of the 
victim’s gravestones, where the inscriptions were clearly readable, 
and both gravestones from a distance, next to vases of flowers.4  Both 
Kelly and Zamudio were sentenced to death, and in each case the 
California Supreme Court upheld the use of the victim impact 
testimony.5  The complaint in the Kelly and Zamudio certiorari 
petitions was that VIE should not be admissible in a capital case 
because it unduly appeals to the emotions and sentiments of the jury 
and presents highly prejudicial testimony.  The defendants in the two 
cases asked the Court to put restrictions on the kinds of testimony 
that should be allowed as victim impact evidence. 
 
 3.  Kelly, 555 U.S at 1021 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 4.  Zamudio, 43 Cal. 4th at 363. 
 5.  Kelly, 555 U.S. at 2021 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The video in Kelly v. California 
may be viewed online at http://www.supremecourt.gov/media/08/kelly_v_california.wmv.  
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This was not, of course, the first time the Court had the 
opportunity to rule on VIE.  In fact, there is a rather controversial 
history involving victim impact evidence in capital cases.6  In Booth v. 
Maryland7 and again two years later in South Carolina v. Gathers,8 a 
majority of the Court held that victim impact evidence was not 
admissible in capital penalty hearings.  Among the many problems 
that the majority identified with VIE was the risk that it would 
inflame the emotions of penalty phase jurors by focusing their 
attention on the victim and victim’s family.  As a result, the jury’s 
sentencing decision would be based not upon a rational and reasoned 
consideration of the background and characteristics of the offender 
and the circumstances of the crime, but upon emotional 
considerations.9  In spite of the fact that Booth and Gathers seemed 
like settled law, the Court, just two years after Gathers and with a 
change in personnel, overruled these cases in Payne v. Tennessee,10 
deciding that there was no constitutional bar to the states’ use of VIE 
in capital cases.  The majority opinion in Payne argued that victim 
impact testimony simply gave the prosecution the opportunity to 
balance the defendant’s extensive right to present mitigating evidence 
(via Lockett v. Ohio11) by allowing them to proffer evidence whose 
only purpose is to humanize the victim and give the jury a “‘quick 
glimpse of the life’ which [the] defendant ‘chose to extinguish.’”12  As 
a result of the Payne decision, victim impact statements became 
common in state and federal capital penalty hearings.  Subsequent 
cases such as Kelly and Zamudio presented the Court with the 
opportunity to place some restrictions or limitations either on the 
 
 6.  John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 257 (2003); Logan, Through the Past Darkly, supra note 2. 
 7.  482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
 8.  490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
 9.  The majority opinion in Booth gave other reasons why it found VIE per se 
inadmissible: (1) it is an arbitrary factor since some victims would have family members to 
speak for them, (2) the decision to impose death might easily be swayed by the eloquence 
or articulateness with which family members were able to express their grief, (3) victim 
impact evidence would be tactically very difficult for a defendant to rebut, (4) VIE puts 
the victim and the victim’s worth on trial during the penalty phase and not the defendant. 
482 U.S. at 501–07. 
 10.  501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 11.  438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 12.  Payne, 501 U.S. at 822 (emphasis added). 
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content or format of victim impact testimony—an opportunity on 
which it passed.13 
While VIE is now admissible in both state and federal capital 
penalty hearings, what seems to have been forgotten is the possible 
prejudicial effect that such testimony may have on those deciding the 
sentence.  In both Booth and Gathers, the Court, in deciding that VIE 
was per se impermissible, was clear that this kind of testimony was 
highly prejudicial because it plays upon the emotions of jurors and 
runs the risk that the sentence will not be based upon reason.14  The 
Booth majority feared that the kind of “evidence” presented in victim 
impact statements would do little more than arouse feelings of 
sympathy and empathy for the victim and victim’s family, and that the 
arousal of such strong emotions would lead the jury to help the 
victim’s family in the only way that it could—by voting for a death 
sentence.  The Payne Court, however, claimed that only with VIE 
would it be possible for the sentencer to get a full appreciation of the 
harm done by the murder and that VIE was not likely to be 
prejudicial and should, therefore, be treated like any other kind of 
evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. 
Importantly, there was no evidence presented to the Court in 
Booth, Gathers, Payne, Kelly, or Zamudio that VIE did not appeal to 
the emotions of jurors, or that as a result of VIE, a juror’s attention 
would not be diverted from the blameworthiness of the offender to 
the worthiness of the victim.  Nor was there much credible empirical 
evidence to support Justice Stevens’ claim in his dissent in Payne that 
VIE “encourage[d] jurors to decide in favor of death rather than life 
on the basis of their emotions rather than their reason.”15  Many of 
the claims both by those on the Court who supported and those who 
opposed the use of VIE in capital cases were based on anecdotal 
evidence or intuition rather than solid empirical data.16 
 
 13.  The Court in Payne did not provide any guidance as to what would be 
inadmissible in a victim impact statement except to note that “[i]n the event that evidence 
is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.”  Id. 
at 825.  
 14.  Earlier, in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977), the Court stated that the 
decision to sentence someone to death must “be, and appear to be, based on reason rather 
than caprice or emotion.”  
 15.  Payne, 501 U.S. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 16.  Although some of the briefs in Payne cited empirical evidence, none of the 
evidence was related to the effect of VIE on jurors or sentencing.  Studies cited analyzed 
the effects of the use of VIE on victims and practitioners. Some studies on racial 
disparities in sentencing were also cited. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner at 31–32, Payne, 501 
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In this article, we add to the growing stock of empirical evidence 
about the influence that VIE may have in a capital sentencing 
hearing.  We present the results of an experiment in which 
respondents, who were selected from the jury pool in a large city, 
viewed a videotape of an actual penalty phase hearing.  
Approximately one half of the respondents were randomly assigned 
to a condition that included viewing the VIE used by the prosecution 
in the case; the other half viewed the identical videotape where the 
VIE testimony was edited out.  We examine whether witnessing the 
VIE in the case increased the risk that the defendant would be 
sentenced to death.  We also examine if there is a relationship 
between VIE and feelings of sympathy and empathy for the victim 
and victim’s family, as well as whether there is a relationship between 
these emotions and attempts by the jurors to provide comfort to the 
family in the only way that they could—by sentencing the defendant 
to death. 
Our article will proceed as follows.  First, we consider VIE as 
evidence and assess its reliability in capital murder cases.  We then 
show how evidentiary protections provided to an accused before and 
during the trial to prevent unfair prejudice are lacking in the 
sentencing phase.  We consider whether VIE is unfairly prejudicial 
and, if so, whether its unfairly prejudicial nature substantially 
outweighs its probative value.  Next, we present our approach to 
studying VIE with potential jurors who were asked to watch a 
videotape of an actual penalty phase hearing where either the VIE 
used in the case was retained (the experimental group) or edited out 
(the control group).  Finally, we offer the results of our study, the 
problems it identified, and some suggested remedies. 
II.  Is Victim Impact Evidence Relevant and Reliable? 
We consider, initially, the reliability of VIE.  In Payne, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist argued that victim impact testimony “is simply 
another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about 
the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a 
general type long considered by sentencing authorities.”17  The 
 
U.S. 808 (No. 90–5721) (citing Hillenbrand & Smith, Victims Rights Legislation: An 
Assessment of its Impact on Criminal Justice Practitioners and Victims, 1989 A.B.A. SECT. 
CRIM. JUST. 71); Brief of Southern Christian Leadership Conference as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 10–12, Payne, 501 U.S. 808 (No. 90-5721) (citing various studies 
on racial disparities in the application of the death penalty). 
 17.  Payne, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). 
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statement assumes what is routinely discussed and accepted by 
courts—that VIE is relevant evidence.18  Typically, decisions 
concerning the admissibility of potential unfairly prejudicial evidence, 
including victim impact statements, are based on the judges’ personal 
knowledge or beliefs, their experiences, their intuitions about the 
matter, and sometimes upon questionable “empirical” assertions.19  
While intuitive and anecdotal evidence can be informative, rarely do 
courts consider valid and reliable empirical evidence to inform their 
decisions when instructing jurors at the capital sentencing phase. 
Procedural and substantive safeguards provide a variety of 
protections to an accused before and during trial.  In the capital 
sentencing phase, when these safeguards are most needed because the 
defendant’s life is at stake, they are conspicuously absent.  To begin, 
at the trial stage of a capital murder trial—in contrast to the 
sentencing phase—unfair prejudice to parties is taken seriously by the 
court.  Unfair prejudice to a defendant caused, for example, by 
emotionally charged, highly provocative statements about a crime or 
the accused in the press or on television is strictly scrutinized to 
ensure that the jurors selected will remain fair and objective.  
Opinions of potential jurors about the defendant or the crime cannot 
 
 18.  Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983). 
 19.  There are several California cases, for example, in which the appellate court 
commented on defendant’s reference on appeal to empirical studies that showed that 
juries misunderstand jury instructions.  The seminal case appears to be People v. Welch, 
20 Cal. 4th 701 (1999).  “As we said earlier, ‘[w]e presume that jurors comprehend and 
accept the court’s directions.’” People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d. 612, 689 n.17 (1991). The 
presumption that the jurors in this case understood and followed the mitigation instruction 
supplied to them is not rebutted by empirical assertions.  To the contrary, it is based on 
research that is not part of the record and has not been subject to cross examination.  See 
Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1 (1980).  A number of other California courts use 
this quote when responding to defendant’s attempts to offer empirical evidence on appeal 
that was not introduced at sentencing.  Here, the court was unwilling to consider empirical 
evidence that apparently was not introduced at trial and, therefore, subject to challenge by 
cross-examination.  This line of cases demonstrates two things.  First, judges make 
assumptions about the jurors’ understanding and ability to follow the court’s instructions.  
Second, these assumptions were not rebutted by empirical assertions to the contrary based 
on research that is not part of the present record and has not been subject to cross 
examination.  In one of the studies relied upon by defendant to prove his assertion that 
jurors do not understand instructions regarding mitigating circumstances and aggravating 
factors, the authors purported to demonstrate that of 30 people interviewed who had 
formerly served on juries in capital cases, only 13 showed a “reasonably accurate 
comprehension of the concepts aggravating and mitigating,” while “fully one-third of our 
sample refocused the penalty phase inquiry entirely on the nature of the crime itself, and 
did so in a way that amounted to a presumption in favor or death.”  Craig Haney et al., 
Deciding to Take Life: Capital Juries, Sentencing Decisions and the Jurisprudence of Death, 
50 J. SOC. ISSUES 149, 162, 169 (1994) (italics omitted).  
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be unfairly prejudiced by news coverage before any evidence is heard.  
Safeguards are used to guarantee fundamental fairness and due 
process to the defendant.  When the community of potential jurors 
has been exposed to unfairly prejudicial media coverage, courts assess 
whether it is likely they will be able to decide the case fairly and 
impartially based upon the evidence presented.  When the court 
determines that an accused cannot receive a fair trial due to unfairly 
prejudicial pretrial publicity, it can transfer venue of the case to a 
jurisdiction where the pool of jurors has not been tainted.  By 
contrast, during capital sentencing proceedings, jurors are permitted, 
indeed they are invited, to hear evidence from the victim impact 
witnesses that has not been protected by any procedural safeguards—
such as those provided during trial by the rules of evidence—and 
which includes highly emotionally provocative (oral and visual) 
testimony that is at least as unfairly prejudicial as the pretrial 
publicity from which they were protected. 
Similarly, pretrial rules of discovery reduce “trial by surprise” 
and require an exchange of information that the parties require for a 
full and fair hearing.  Rarely, however, does counsel receive full 
disclosure of victim impact testimony during the discovery process. 
Jurors, in addition, are questioned during voir dire prior to trial 
in order to identify certain prejudices against or biases in favor of the 
parties.  Jurors may be stricken for cause when their bias or prejudice 
prevents them from serving impartially.  Further, the parties may 
strike a limited number of jurors by the use of peremptory challenges 
when the court refuses to excuse for cause.  Capital jurors must be 
willing to impose death if the evidence supports that sentence—that 
is, only “death-qualified”20 jurors are eligible to serve.  However, even 
these may be stricken for cause if the court finds them unable to be 
fair and impartial.  Typically, when jurors disclose a potential bias or 
prejudice during voir dire, they are asked whether the fact disclosed 
would prevent them from rendering a fair and impartial decision.  
Some jurors, confident in their ability to overcome their 
acknowledged bias or prejudice, and giving assurances to the court to 
this effect, may be permitted by the court to remain on the jury, often 
requiring counsel to use a peremptory challenge. 
Importantly, jurors are not questioned extensively during voir 
dire, nor could they be, about their reactions, biases or potential 
prejudice to VIE that they have not yet seen or heard.  Exposure to 
 
 20.  Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).  
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VIE before the jurors have determined the merits of the case is 
precisely the type of potentially unfair prejudicial evidence, like 
pretrial media coverage, that the court takes pains to keep from 
jurors.  While jurors are likely to hear some evidence during the trial 
that is also relevant for sentencing purposes, they will not hear all of 
the VIE until the sentencing phase.  The capital sentencing phase 
provides the opportunity for the full theatrical and emotionally 
provocative impact of the evidence when it is likely to have its most 
prejudicial impact. 
As in the pretrial stage, elimination of unfairly prejudicial 
evidence at trial is fundamental to securing a just result, fairness, and 
due process for the defendant.  In this spirit, rules of evidence are 
established and construed to “administer every proceeding fairly, 
eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the 
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and 
securing a just determination.”21  We next briefly consider these rules 
as they are applied to eliminate or reduce unfair prejudice to the 
parties during the guilt phase of the capital murder trial; and we 
consider how they would eliminate or reduce the danger of unfair 
prejudice in the form of VIE if they were applied during the capital 
sentencing phase.  First, the rules of evidence require that evidence 
must be relevant to be admissible.  Relevant evidence is defined as “if 
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in 
determing the action.”22  Relevance is relational because it requires 
that evidence is material to a matter of consequence in the case at 
hand.23  In addition, it must be probative of the proposition for which 
it is offered.24  If either requirement is missing, the offered evidence is 
 
 21.  FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 22.  FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 23.  The term “action” within the meaning of Rule 401 includes criminal and civil 
cases.  Typically, lawyers attempt to identify the universe of potentially relevant evidence 
by looking not only to the statutes and case law, but to the pleadings—e.g., the bill of 
complaint and defenses in a civil case and the charging document, such as the indictment, 
the defenses raised, as well as the criminal and civil pattern jury instructions.  Rule 401 has 
two requirements.  To be relevant, evidence must be probative (e.g., have any tendency to 
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence), and this 
probative fact must be material to a claim or defense, (e.g., of consequence in determining 
the action).  The charging document is the critically important document that provides to 
the defendant the procedural Due Process requirement of notice. 
 24.  “Relevance is a relational concept and carries meaning only in context. . . . 
Relevance requires a ‘relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly 
provable in the case,’ and the existence of such a relationship is determined by ‘principles 
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not relevant.25  In Payne, the Court found VIE to be relevant to the 
issue of the harm caused by the defendant, including its effects on the 
survivors, as well as the offender’s culpability and blameworthiness. 
Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.26  Furthermore, relevant 
evidence is not necessarily admissible.  To be admissible it must also 
be reliable.27  The Federal Rules of Evidence and most state rules of 
evidence reflect the common law preference for inclusion, rather than 
exclusion, of evidence to ensure that the truth may be fairly 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.28  Relevant evidence 
may be excluded when the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, misleading the jury, considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.29  As 
gatekeepers of the evidence, judges protect the fundamental rights of 
the accused from evidence that is irrelevant or, if relevant, is so 
fundamentally unreliable or unfairly prejudicial as to prove worthless 
to the fact finder.30  Deference is appropriately given to trial judges 
making Rule 403 determinations; however, their decisions to admit or 
exclude evidence may be reversed when they are “arbitrary and 
irrational.”31  Even when it appears that judges’ rulings are rationally 
based upon their knowledge and perception, there remains a 
substantial danger that they may not understand or appreciate the 
 
evolved by experience or science, applied logically to the situation at hand.’ . . . It is 
sometimes appropriate for counsel to submit additional information to assist the court in 
making this determination . . .  Evidence offered to assist the court in making a relevancy 
determination, such as scientific studies or treatises, is not limited by the rules of evidence, 
other than rules of privilege. . . .  Scientific research has disproved many linkages thought 
to exist and has identified other connections and correlations that are not commonly 
known. Thus in some cases counsel would be wise not to rely solely on the personal 
knowledge that the judge brings to the ruling at hand.” CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & 
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.2, 154-55 n.10 (3d ed. 2003). 
 25.  FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 26.  FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 27.  See Precision Piping and Instruments, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 951 
F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1991); Plastipak Packaging, Inc., v. DePasquale, 75 F. App’x 86 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
 28.  FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 29.  FED. R. EVID. 403 provides that evidence, although relevant, “may be excluded 
where the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  (emphasis 
added). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Bhaya v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 922 F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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significance of other evidence that might more accurately inform 
them and their juries.32 
While rules of evidence are essential to ensure justice, fairness 
and due process during trial, historically, they were not applied during 
sentencing.  Moreover, they are not applicable under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence at sentencing.33  The Court in Payne, providing 
little guidance as to what evidence might be inadmissible in VIE, 
offered merely, “in the event that evidence is introduced that is so 
prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism 
for relief.”34  The results of our study illustrate that when our sample 
jurors were exposed even to a relatively low dose of VIE, its effect 
caused substantial bias toward the victim and the victim’s family, as 
well as prejudice against the accused where such bias and prejudice 
was sufficient to deny due process. 
In spite of the fact that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not 
apply during sentencing, courts routinely make Rule 403 assessments 
of the victim impact evidence to determine whether the probative 
value of victim impact evidence is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of, among other things, unfair prejudice.  We urge them to 
consider empirical evidence such as that produced by our study to 
assess the danger of VIE evidence in capital sentencing proceedings.  
Although courts routinely make rulings during the trial without the 
benefit of empirical evidence, the rules of evidence applicable at trials 
provide both guidance and limitations regarding the admissibility of 
various kinds of evidence.  Beyond the protections against unfairly 
prejudicial evidence found in Rule 403, the rules of evidence provide 
additional guidance to judges and safeguards to the parties. 
Consider the topic of character evidence.  While the rules of 
evidence are essential to ensuring justice, fairness and due process at 
trial, historically, they were not applied during sentencing.  By the 
 
 32.  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 2003) “It is sometimes 
appropriate for counsel to submit additional information to assist the court in making this 
(the relevance) determination. Scientific research has disprove many linkages thought to 
exist and has identified other connections and correlation that are not commonly known. 
Thus in some cases counsel would be wise not to rely solely on the personal knowledge 
that the judge brings to the ruling at hand.” 
 33.  FED. R. EVID. 1101(d). “The rules—except for those on privilege—do not apply 
to the following: . . . (3) miscellaneous proceedings such as: . . .  sentencing . . .”. 
 34.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). 
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common law, sentences were fixed and imposed by the court.35  
Currently, however, the rules stipulate that the rules of evidence are 
inapplicable at sentencing.  Therefore, while judges routinely consider 
unfair prejudice during capital sentencing proceedings they are not 
obliged to adhere to any of the rules of evidence that we discuss.  
Other than Rule 402 and possibly Rule 403, which courts seem willing 
to apply during sentencing, none of the other protections afforded by 
the other rules of evidence are available to capital defendants during 
the sentencing phase.  The result (which follows) is that evidence 
inadmissible during the trial is routinely admitted during sentencing.  
Some examples include things like improper character evidence, 
improper hearsay, improper lay opinion, inadequate foundations for 
admitting evidence, etc.  In this article we argue that judges should 
adopt and utilize all of the rules of evidence during the sentencing 
phase just as they do during the guilt phase of the trial.  Indeed, as 
capital sentencing proceedings become ever more susceptible to the 
dangers that exist during trial, the rules of evidence applied at 
sentencing becoming increasingly important and necessary. 
Rule 404(a) prohibits the circumstantial use of character 
evidence of the defendant to show that the defendant acted in 
conformity with that character or character trait on a particular 
occasion in question.36  The danger is that the jury would find the 
defendant guilty not because of what he did on this occasion, but 
because of who he is and what he did in the past—his propensity, 
based on character, to commit this act too.  Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts may be offered for any relevant purpose other than to 
show conformity with that character in the current case.37  However, 
Rule 404(a) provides three exceptions to the general prohibition 
against using character evidence to show conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion.  Rule 404(a)(2)(A) allows the defendant to 
introduce pertinent evidence of his or her own character.  This is 
consistent with the defendant’s constitutionally protected rights at 
trial.  Of course, when the defendant offers evidence of his good 
character, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it.  In addition, 
Rule 404(a)(2)(B) allows, subject to the limitations of Rule 412 (the 
Rape Shield Statute), a defendant to offer evidence of an alleged 
 
 35.  “By the common law, the jury determined merely the guilt or innocence of the 
prisoner, and if their verdict was guilty, their duties were at an end. The court alone 
determined what the punishment should be . . .”  Fields v. State, 47 Ala. 603, 606 (1872). 
 36.  The unfairly prejudicial nature of such evidence is assumed. 
 37.  FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
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victim’s pertinent trait; and if admitted, the prosecutor may offer 
evidence to rebut and evidence of the defendant’s same trait.  Rule 
404(a)(2)(C) provides that in a homicide case, the prosecutor may 
offer evidence of the alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness to rebut 
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.  Rule 404(a)(3) 
provides that evidence of a witness’s character may be admitted, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.  These rules involve a specific 
character trait of the witness, namely, the witness’s character for 
truthfulness.  Character is proven by testimony as to reputation or in 
the form of the character witness’s opinion and, during cross-
examination, by relevant specific instances of conduct to assess the 
capacity of the witness to form the opinion or reputation evidence of 
the pertinent character trait.38 
During trial, then, the prosecution may not offer evidence of the 
defendant’s character unless and until the defendant first offers 
evidence of his or her character or that of a victim, as provided in 
Rule 404. 
Character evidence, when introduced, may only be offered in the 
manner specified in Rule 405. Entitled “Methods of Proving 
Character,” this rule provides three ways of proving character.  First, 
when evidence of a person’s character or trait of character is 
admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the person’s 
reputation—i.e., what is this person’s reputation in the relevant 
community, for example, for peacefulness?  Character may also be 
proved by testimony in the form of opinion—for example, the witness 
may offer her personal opinion about a relevant character trait of the 
person.  However, on cross-examination of the character witness, the 
court may allow inquiry into relevant specific instances of the 
person’s conduct that relate to the character trait in question.  On 
cross-examination, the reputation or opinion character witness is 
examined about the underlying circumstances of her basis of 
knowledge, or lack thereof, to form an opinion, or the circumstances 
underlying her ability to testify as to the person’s reputation in the 
community.  The cross-examination is designed to test the basis of the 
witness’s opinion or reputation testimony, i.e., to show that the 
character witness really doesn’t know the person well enough to offer 
an opinion of her character trait or, perhaps, to bring to her attention 
specific instances of conduct that are inconsistent with the opinion 
expressed by the witness and which, when made known, may changes 
 
 38.  FED. R. EVID. 405. 
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the witness’s opinion of the person.  Importantly, during trial, 
evidence of specific instances of character may not be offered during 
direct examination, other than when character is “in issue,” or is first 
offered by the defendants as provided in Rule 404. 
In those limited instances when “character is in issue,” i.e., when 
a person’s character or trait is an essential element of the claim or 
defense (such as a defense of entrapment, or truth as a defense to a 
claim of defamation), character may also be proved not just by 
opinion or reputation, but by relevant specific instances of conduct.  
But the prosecution would not be allowed to introduce specific 
instances of conduct to show character or a character trait, even if 
relevant, during its case in chief. 
In the capital sentencing phase, in contrast to the guilt phase, 
these important safeguards do not apply.  Instead, evidence of the 
good character of the victim is admitted, contrary to Rule 404, 
whether or not the defendant attacks the character of the victim and 
even if the defendant offers no mitigation evidence.  The victim 
impact evidence in our case study included testimony about the 
character of the victim to show that he was a generous man, a 
religious man, a loving and caring parent and family man and that he 
was proud to be a police officer: “[he] was a person who would do 
anything for you. . . .  He loved God.  He loved being a father.  He 
loved his family and friends, and most of all being a police officer.”  It 
included specific instances of conduct to support their opinions about 
the victim.  If evidence of specific instances of the character of a 
victim were offered by the prosecution during its case in chief, they 
typically would be excluded by the rules discussed.  Such evidence 
might be admissible by the prosecution for other purposes, such as to 
show bias or interest.  Capital sentencing proceedings, by contrast, 
allow victim impact witnesses to offer evidence of the character of the 
victim by opinion, reputation, and by specific instances of conduct.  
Moreover, statements of the victim’s religious beliefs and that he 
truly loves God, for example, would not admissible at trial to enhance 
the witness’s credibility. 
The danger in admitting such evidence is that jurors might be 
swayed to find the declarant, and statements about him, more 
credible simply because of a juror’s and victim’s shared religious 
beliefs.  Such testimony would violate the rules prohibiting such 
evidence if improperly offered to enhance or diminish the credibility 
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of the witness during trial.39  In capital sentencing proceedings, 
evidence of the deceased victim’s belief in God is irrelevant, since his 
credibility as a witness is not an issue.  It is relevant at trial only if the 
witness were to testify and then it would be excluded by Rule 610.  In 
capital sentence proceedings, however, jurors are allowed to consider 
such evidence, not to enhance the victim’s credibility as a witness, but 
for an even more dangerous, unfair, and impermissible purpose: to 
show that his belief in God makes him a better person than the 
defendant. 
Another evidentiary protection provided at trial is the 
requirement that witnesses demonstrate personal knowledge of the 
matters about which they testify.40  The rule is designed to improve 
the reliability of evidence by requiring witnesses to testify to their 
own observations and perceptions.  Victim impact witnesses no doubt 
offer appropriate lay opinion testimony about many facts that are 
rationally based on their personal observations and perceptions.41  But 
lay opinion testimony at trial must also “be helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact 
in issue.”42  It has been assumed by courts that victim impact evidence 
is helpful to jurors in these ways.  Our study questions this 
assumption. 
Finally, lay witnesses are not permitted to offer expert opinions; 
that is, the opinions of lay witnesses may not “be based on scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge.”43  During the trial phase, 
the rules of evidence require that opinions concerning such 
specialized matters as medical and psychological conditions and 
causation are to be offered only by a qualified expert in the field.44  
Further, the reliability of the expert opinion and the basis of that 
opinion must be established.45  Nevertheless, in the sentencing phase, 
victim impact witnesses often offer opinion evidence that describes 
physical and psychological symptoms attributed to the crime and the 
defendant.  Undoubtedly, victims’ families’ tragic experiences 
produce grave physical, psychological, and emotional effects.  
 
 39.  FED. R. EVID. 405; FED. R. EVID. 610. 
 40.  FED. R. EVID. 602. 
 41.  FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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Nevertheless, victim impact evidence routinely includes improper and 
unfairly prejudicial expert opinion in violation of these rules. 
Still other safeguards designed to prevent unfair prejudice during 
the trial phase can be found in the rules of evidence.  Significantly, 
witnesses may be cross-examined about their testimony and may be 
impeached to show their bias, prejudice, or interest in the outcome of 
the case, and to show corruption (that the witness has the been paid 
to lie).46  Moreover, witnesses may be impeached by use of their prior 
inconsistent statements or the contradictory evidence of others.47  In 
addition, a witness’s character for truthfulness48 may be attacked by 
opinion, reputation, and, on cross-examination, by specific instances 
of conduct and by evidence of conviction for certain crimes and other 
wrongful acts relevant to the credibility of the witness.49  The 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses is a fundamental 
right of the accused, and this important right is essential to allow a 
defendant to challenge any witness who testifies against him at any 
stage of the proceeding.50 
John Henry Wigmore suggested that cross-examination is the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth but 
cautioned that just as one “‘can do anything . . . with a bayonet—
except sit on it’, a lawyer can do anything with cross-examination—if 
he or she is skillful enough not to impale his own cause upon it.”51  
Fearing they might do just that, most defense lawyers wisely opt not 
to risk impaling their clients who face the death sentence by 
attempting to impeach or even to cross-examine victim impact 
witnesses.  The dangerous and unfortunate consequence of this is that 
the truth about what is said about the defendant or the victim, by 
victim impact witnesses, is likely to remain elusive and almost 
certainly unchallenged.  Stated somewhat differently, the defendant is 
deprived of the opportunity to face and confront his accusers in any 
meaningful way.  The result is nothing less than a violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment envisioned by the 
 
 46.  FED. R. EVID. 611. 
 47.  FED. R. EVID. 613. 
 48.  FED. R. EVID. 608. 
 49.  FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 50.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 51.  5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 
(James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1974).  The unfairly prejudicial nature of such evidence 
is assumed. 
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Court in Payne as the “mechanism” to address evidence that is so 
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.52 
Another evidentiary protection at trial is the rule against 
hearsay.  Hearsay statements are out-of-court statements made by a 
declarant that are offered in court to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.53  Hearsay testimony, generally, is disfavored because jurors 
are deprived of the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the 
declarant while hearing his testimony.  In addition, hearsay declarants 
are not subject to the oath; they are not present in court to declare 
that they will testify truthfully.54  Nor are they subject to cross-
examination at trial.  The rules of evidence exclude hearsay 
statements offered during trial, unless they are shown to be 
admissible under at least one of the hearsay exceptions.55  In the 
capital sentencing phase, however, hearsay evidence is routinely 
offered as substantive evidence to prove the truth of what victim 
impact witness is asserting about the victim, about the effect of the 
victim’s death on the witness and others, and about the defendant.  
Regardless of whether this evidence would be admissible at trial, no 
such determination is made at sentencing.  The result is that hearsay 
statements are routinely admitted that are often unfairly prejudicial 
to a defendant who is powerless to challenge them. 
Finally, in addition to those rules discussed, still other rules seek 
to ensure that an expert opinion is reliable;56 that evidence is properly 
authenticated and identified;57 and that the reliability of a writing, 
recording, or photograph is established if one intends to prove the 
contents of it.  In capital sentencing proceedings, none of these 
safeguards apply. 
Without the full protection of the rules of evidence, we are left 
with victim impact evidence that, although deemed relevant, 
presumably may be excluded only if it can be shown that it is so 
unfairly prejudicial as to substantially outweigh its probative value.  
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if it has an undue tendency to 
suggest decisions on an improper basis—commonly, though not 
always, an emotional basis.58  It is unfairly prejudicial if it “appeals to 
 
 52.  Id at n. 13. 
 53.  FED. R. EVID. 801. 
 54.  FED. R. EVID. 603. 
 55.  FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, & 807. 
 56.  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 57.  FED. R. EVID. 901. 
 58.  FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note. 
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the jury’s sympathy, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct 
to punish” or otherwise may cause a jury to base its decision on 
something other than the established propositions in the case.59  Does 
victim impact evidence, then, have an undue tendency to suggest the 
sentencing decision the jurors should make based on emotions or 
similar improper basis?  Is victim impact evidence merely an appeal 
to the sympathies of the jurors that arouses their sense of horror?  
Does it provoke the jurors’ instinct to punish?  Does it otherwise 
cause a jury to base its decisions on something other than the 
evidence? 
III.  Is Victim Impact Evidence Unfairly Prejudicial?   
Existing Empirical Evidence 
Given the lack of procedural and evidentiary safeguards in the 
sentencing phase, as discussed supra, it becomes even more important 
to provide jurors with adequate information to ensure fairness in 
capital sentencing proceedings.  Empirical evidence is an essential 
tool needed to inform, more fully and fairly, juror decision making in 
these proceedings.  Jurors will, no doubt, continue to rely upon their 
intuitions, anecdotal evidence, and their common sense.60  However, 
they should also be permitted to consider valid and reliable empirical 
evidence to inform their decisions.  As our study clearly 
demonstrates, empirical evidence provides additional, essential 
information about which jurors are likely to be unaware.  There is no 
reason to believe or fear that jurors will not apply their same common 
sense, intuitions, and life experiences to the empirical evidence 
presented as they do to other evidence they consider.  In the case of 
VIE testimony, there are empirical studies that have investigated the 
 
 59.  See Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing J. Weinstein & M. 
Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶403(03) (1978)); accord, Old Chief v. United States, 519 
U.S. 172, 180 (1997). 
 60.  Baze v. Rees 553 U.S. 35, 90 (2008) “. . . It is simply not our place to choose one 
set of responsible empirical studies over another in interpreting the Constitution. Nor is it 
our place to demand that state legislatures support their criminal sanctions with foolproof 
empirical studies, rather than commonsense predictions about human behavior. “The 
value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the 
resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of 
statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach 
that is not available to the courts.”  Were Justice Stevens’ current view the constitutional 
test, even his own preferred criminal sanction—life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole—may fail constitutional scrutiny, because it is entirely unclear that enough 
empirical evidence supports that sanction as compared to alternatives such as life with the 
possibility of parole . . .”. 
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effect that such testimony has on the process and outcome of capital 
penalty phase deliberation.  Prosecutors are free to present jurors 
with empirical evidence challenging the validity of findings such as 
ours.  We now consider how jurors might use empirical evidence 
when deciding whether someone lives or dies.  We then move to a 
discussion of our empirical study of the affect of VIE testimony which 
we think improves upon these earlier efforts providing more valid 
information about the consequences of VIE testimony. 
The empirical evidence available to date suggests, but does not 
prove, that victim impact evidence appeals to the emotions of jurors 
thereby leading them to sentence defendants to death.  Many prior 
studies have found that the risk of a death sentence is higher in the 
presence of VIE than in its absence.  The evidence is not definitive, 
however, because many of these studies have neglected to measure 
subjects’ emotional states, have used various types of convenience 
samples, have asked subjects to read the victim impact evidence 
rather than witness it as delivered, or have failed to voir dire subjects 
before the study to ensure that they would have been eligible to serve 
on a capital jury.61  Luginbuhl and Burkhead used a sample of 
university students who were told that the defendant in a depicted 
crime had been convicted of capital murder and their task was to 
make a determination as to what sentence he was to receive.62  The 
subjects were not voir dired for death qualification prior to their 
participation in the study.  They were then randomly assigned to two 
groups both of which read identical written summaries of the 
prosecution and defense arguments for the penalty; but only one 
group was provided with victim impact evidence. Luginbuhl and 
Burkhead found a substantial effect for VIE: when it was present 
51% of the subjects voted for death, but only 20% of the time when it 
was absent.63 
 
 61.  Jurors in capital cases are extensively voir dired to determine if they are eligible 
to serve. In the voir dire, potential jurors are asked standard questions such as whether or 
not they knew the victim or know the victim’s family, and if they have heard about the 
crime and have already formed an opinion about it.  In capital cases, however, potential 
jurors are also asked about their views about the death penalty. Under the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), potential jurors could be 
struck if their attitude toward the death penalty would “prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” 
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).  
 62.  James Luginbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital 
Trial: Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (1995). 
 63.  Id. 
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Myers and Arbuthnot examined the effect of victim impact 
evidence within a group of 416 undergraduate psychology students.64  
Subjects were randomly assigned to a jury under one of four 
conditions: VIE shown and evidence of defendant’s guilt was strong, 
VIE shown and evidence of guilt was weak, no VIE and strong 
evidence of guilt, no VIE and weak evidence of guilt.  Subjects were 
not death qualified prior to participation.  Each juror watched a 
videotape of a murder trial that lasted sixty minutes and was asked 
before deliberating if they thought the defendant was guilty and what 
punishment they would impose.  Jurors then deliberated in mock 
juries and were again asked to decide if the defendant was guilty.  In 
juries where the defendant was found guilty, jurors watched a mini-
penalty hearing (where VIE was either present or absent) and were 
asked to determine sentence.  Myers and Arbuthnot found that there 
was no relationship between viewing victim impact evidence and the 
sentence imposed before deliberations.  However, at post-
deliberation 67% of those jurors who voted for guilt imposed a death 
sentence if they watched the VIE, but only 30% imposed a death 
sentence under the no-VIE condition. 
Myers et al.’s subjects came from a convenience sample of 294 
adults who were approached in train stations and airports in central 
California.65  Participants were eligible for jury duty in California (had 
a driver’s license, were at least eighteen years old, and were U.S. 
citizens) and were death qualified.  Subjects were given a three-page 
written trial summary of the guilt phase of a capital murder case and a 
more detailed written summary of the penalty phase.  In addition to a 
condition with no victim impact statement, there were four 
experimental conditions based on the presence of language in the 
VIE that humanized the victim, dehumanized the defendant, 
humanized the victim and dehumanized the defendant, or neither 
humanized the victim nor dehumanized the defendant.  After reading 
the summaries of the guilt and penalty phase of the trial, subjects 
were asked to render a sentencing judgment of life or death, rate the 
suffering that relatives of the victim had experienced, and rate the 
level of compassion they felt for the defendant.  There was no 
 
 64.  Brian Myers & Jack Arbuthnot, The Effects of Victim Impact Evidence on the 
Verdicts and Sentencing Judgments of Mock Jurors, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 494 
(2004). 
 65.  Brian Myers et al., Victim Impact Statements and Mock Juror Sentencing: The 
Impact of Dehumanizing Language on a Death Qualified Sample, 22 AM. J. FORENSIC 
PSYCHOL. 39 (2004). 
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relationship found between the reading of VIE evidence and 
sentencing outcome: 60% of those who saw no VIE recommended 
the death penalty and 58.5% under the condition where there was a 
VIE and it dehumanized the defendant.  Surprisingly, a death 
sentence recommendation was least likely where there was a VIE that 
both humanized the victim and demonized the defendant (34%).  
Moreover, the dehumanizing language of the VIE had no effect 
either on the level of compassion that the subjects felt toward the 
defendant nor on the amount of suffering they felt the victim’s family 
was experiencing. 
Although several studies have found that viewing victim impact 
evidence is related to a higher risk of a death sentence, many of these 
studies did not use subjects who had been voir dired to determine 
whether they were eligible to serve on a capital jury; many used 
university students or other convenience samples, and many studies 
gave subjects only written summaries of penalty phase testimony and 
victim impact evidence rather than showing them the evidence as 
presented in the hearing itself.  In the present study we hope to 
overcome many of these issues as well as provide some explanation as 
to why victim impact evidence has the effect on jurors that it does. 
IV.  Methods 
A.  Sample 
Subjects for the study were adults randomly selected from a juror 
registration list used by the criminal court of a large city in a mid-
Atlantic state.  The original juror list consisted of approximately 
250,000 names.  Names were selected from this list at random and 
selected names were then searched for phone numbers from a variety 
of online telephone search sites. Numbers that were found were 
called by members of the research team.66  After confirming that they 
were still residents of the city and still eligible to serve as jurors (they 
had not been convicted of a felony), they were asked if they would be 
interested in participating in a research project about citizens’ 
attitudes about the death penalty.  Of those initially called, about 
75% agreed to participate further in the research.  These people were 
 
 66.  In this city, jury registration lists are based upon a compilation of information 
from voter registration and motor vehicle registration lists and includes the phone 
numbers that jury commissioners would use in trying to locate jurors to call them for jury 
service.  In addition, the jury commissioner sends out about 5,000 forms by mail to “pre-
qualify” jurors and keep they jury registration list up to date.  The list was provided by the 
chief administrative judge of the criminal circuit. 
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then asked a series of questions to qualify them as jurors in the 
particular case at hand.67  They were also asked questions about the 
death penalty to determine whether their opinion/feeling about the 
death penalty would preclude them from being able to follow the law 
in imposing sentence, or if they would be able to consider all 
sentencing options.68  Those who passed this screener were “death 
qualified” and were given an appointment to appear at the law school 
for the study.  A total of 135 adults were qualified for the study. 
B.  Procedure 
Once subjects arrived at the law school they were directed to the 
study room and provided with a three-page description of the crime 
that included the facts brought out in the actual guilt phase of the trial 
(for a summary of the facts of the case, see Appendix A).  They were 
then told that the defendant in this case had been convicted of capital 
murder by a jury and that their job was to watch actual penalty phase 
testimony via video and determine what they thought was the 
appropriate sentence.  Subjects then watched a three and one half 
hour video of the actual penalty phase of the trial.  They were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions: (1) the VIE was included 
in the penalty phase testimony (n=73), or (2) the VIE was edited out 
(n=62).  The videotape of the penalty phase testimony was obtained 
from the trial court.69  The subjects watched the videotape of the 
penalty phase hearing on a large screen, in some cases alone, in some 
cases with other subjects.  After viewing the videotape, the subjects 
were asked to complete a written questionnaire.  The questionnaire 
 
 67.  The case that the subjects were to determine sentence in involved the killing of a 
police officer.  The killing had taken place in the jurisdiction some seven years before our 
research.  During the voir dire, all potential jurors were asked if they had ever heard of the 
case and had formed an opinion about it, if they were employees of law enforcement or 
the judicial system, or if someone in their immediate family was a police officer or 
employed by a law enforcement/judicial agency.  General facts about the case and some 
indication as to the prosecution’s theory and defense strategy are provided in Appendix 
A.  
 68.  In asking respondents if they could follow the law in coming to the appropriate 
sentence in the case we were trying to mimic the prevailing standard set in Wainwright v. 
Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985): “The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror 
may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the 
juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a 
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’”  
 69.  The videotape was edited by us in certain places.  In order to shorten what we 
asked subjects to watch for the research project one defense witness was edited out, and 
all bench conversations between the judge and the lawyers were also edited out since real 
jurors would not be privy to those conversations.  
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first elicited information about various emotions the subjects 
themselves might be experiencing, then asked questions about their 
attitudes toward the defendant, victim and victim’s family.  Finally, at 
the end of the questionnaire they were asked what sentence they 
would have imposed in the case if they had been on the jury.  The 
questionnaire took approximately forty-five minutes to complete, and 
all were completed by each subject in a room alone.  There was no 
group or jury deliberation.  Subjects were thanked for their 
participation, research staff answered any questions subjects had, and 
subjects then were paid $75 before leaving the law school. 
C.  Variables 
i. Dependent Variable 
Our main interest was in the effect that witnessing the victim 
impact evidence had on the subject’s decision in the specific case at 
hand to vote for either a death sentence, a life sentence without 
parole, or a life sentence.70  At the end of the questionnaire, after all 
other information with the exception of demographic information had 
been obtained, each subject was asked: “If you were a juror in this 
case, what would you have voted for as the appropriate punishment 
for [the defendant’s name]?”  For purposes of data analysis, 
sometimes we treated the response options as a dichotomy, “life” and 
“death,” and sometimes we retained the variable with its original 
three levels. 
In addition to how subjects would have voted had they been a 
juror in the penalty phase of the case, we also inquired about their 
general attitude toward the death penalty; and since the case involved 
the murder of a police officer we asked respondents about their 
attitudes toward the police.  Subjects were asked if they thought: (1) 
capital punishment was under any circumstances cruel and inhumane, 
(2) the death penalty was morally wrong, and (3) if a person takes 
someone’s life, they should be put to death.  Finally, subjects were 
asked to agree or disagree with four statements meant to capture 
their attitudes toward law enforcement: (1) “Police officers should be 
treated with respect no matter how they treat you”; (2) “Killing a 
police officer is worse than killing a regular citizen”; (3) “Police 
officers usually do the right thing”; and (4) “Police officers are pillars 
of the community.”  Response options for all seven questions ranged 
 
 70.  In this jurisdiction the possible sentence options for conviction of a capital crime 
were: death, life in prison without the possibility of parole, and a life with parole sentence. 
DEISE_PATERNOSTER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/4/2013  1:15 PM 
Spring 2013]    VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE AND DEATH SENTENCING 633 
on a four-point continuum from “strongly disagree” to “strongly 
agree.” 
ii.  Independent Variable 
The key independent variable was the presence in the videotape 
of the penalty hearing of victim impact evidence.  Death qualified 
subjects were randomly assigned to watch either the control (no VIE) 
or experimental (VIE) penalty phase video.  The testimony given in 
this victim impact evidence lasted for approximately 15-20 minutes of 
the approximately three-and-one-half-hour penalty phase hearing.  
The victim’s sister, who provided the VIE, was visibly emotional in 
giving her testimony and she lost her composure at one point.  The 
victim impact evidence in this case provided the three kinds of 
information found in the Booth case and in many other victim impact 
statements.  First there was evidence with respect to the character of 
the victim: “[He] was a person who would do anything for you . . .  He 
loved God.  He loved being a father.  He loved his family and friends, 
and most of all being a police officer.”  Second, there was testimony 
about the impact of the murder on family members: “[His daughter] 
misses him so much.  She sits in front of his picture and talks to him 
about what she did in school and she can write her name or she would 
write him a letter and want Momma to put a stamp on it.”  Finally, 
there is a hint as to what the family would like to see as a punishment 
for the offender: “Nothing can change what he did, but he must face 
the consequences of his actions.  This is why I ask you the jury for a 
just punishment for an unjustifiable death.” 
D.  Other Variables 
We measured many components of the subjects’ attitudes toward 
the victim and victim’s family, and asked various questions that 
captured the reasons behind the subjects’ sentencing decision.  We 
measured the extent to which the subjects felt sympathy and empathy 
for both the victim and victim’s family with a scale comprised of the 
following nine items: 
 
(1) How well does the word “sympathetic” 
describe how you personally feel about the murder of 
[the victim’s name]? 
(2) How well does the word “sympathetic” 
describe [victim’s name]? 
(3) How well does the word “sympathetic” 
describe the [the victim’s name] family? 
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(4) Did you feel sympathy or pity for [police 
officer’s name] family? 
(5) Did you imagine being like the victim? 
(6) Did you imagine yourself in the victim’s 
situation? 
(7) Did you imagine yourself in the situation of 
the victim’s family and/or friends? 
(8) Did [the victim’s name] family seem very 
different from your own family? 
(9) Did you feel that you knew [victim’s name] 
family personally? 
 
Response options for the first three questions ranged on a four 
point continuum from “very well” to “not at all,” and for the last six 
items on a four point continuum from “yes, very much” to “no, not at 
all.”  A one-factor confirmatory factor analysis of this combined scale 
indicated that all items had a factor loading of 0.60 or higher on the 
one factor, which explained 54% of the variance.  This factor had an 
initial eigenvalue of 4.10, while a second factor had an eigenvalue of 
1.47.  This combined sympathy/empathy scale had a Cronbach’s alpha 
of 0.88. 
Based upon the Court’s conjecture in both Booth (the majority) 
and Payne (the dissenters), we would hypothesize that hearing VIE 
will increase subjects’ feelings of sympathy and empathy for the 
victim and victim’s family.  We would also hypothesize that 
Respondents who have greater sympathy/empathy for the victim and 
victim’s family will be more likely to want to help the family by 
imposing a death sentence. 
In an attempt to understand the salience of different possible 
reasons for the juror’s sentencing decision, we asked “how important” 
each of the following factors was in their sentencing decision: (1) the 
offender’s role or responsibility for the crime, (2) sympathy for the 
victim, (3) sympathy for the victim’s family, and (4) their feelings 
about the right punishment.  We examined whether those who viewed 
the victim impact evidence were different from those who did not on 
these items, which would establish some of the consequences of VIE 
in terms of attitudes; and we examined whether those who voted to 
impose death were different on these same items compared with 
those who voted either for life without parole or a straight life 
sentence. 
Finally, subjects were asked two more questions as possible 
reasons behind their sentencing decision, and we related responses to 
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these two items to both viewing the VIE and what sentence subjects 
would have imposed in the case.  Subjects were asked, “How well do 
you think the victim’s family is coping with the murder?” with 
response options ranging on an eleven-point continuum from 
“Coping Well” (0) to “Coping Poorly” (10).  The second question 
was, “How much do you think a death sentence for the offender 
would help the victim’s family find closure or help them recover from 
their loss?”  Response options to this question also ranged on an 
eleven-point scale from “No Help” (0) to “A Great Help” (10).  It is 
expected that those who viewed the VIE would be more likely to 
think that the victim’s family was coping poorly and that a death 
sentence would help the victim’s family recover or reach closure.  In 
addition, it is expected that those who thought that the victim’s family 
was coping poorly and that a death sentence would help them recover 
or reach closure would be more likely to impose a sentence of death. 
V.  Results 
Table 1 reports some basic demographic information on the 
experimental (VIE) and control (No VIE) groups.  As a confirmation 
of the random assignment into groups, there are no differences 
between the two groups in their marital status, race, gender, 
education, income, or age. 
Our first substantive issue is the simple question whether or not 
watching the victim impact evidence had an effect on the juror’s 
sentencing decision in the case.  Figure 1 shows what percentage of 
the experimental (VIE) and control (No VIE) groups voted for each 
sentencing option.  Among those who watched the victim impact 
evidence, approximately sixty-two percent voted for death, compared 
with only seventeen percent among the control group.  Potential 
jurors who watched the VIE were, then, more than three times more 
likely to impose a death sentence on the offender (χ2 = 28.27; p < .001; 
γ = .64).  In fact, death was the modal sentence imposed among those 
subjects viewing the VIE, but those who did not view the victim 
impact evidence were about equally likely to impose life without 
parole and a straight life sentence (44.4% vs. 38.1%, respectively).  
This provides substantial support for the view that one effect of 
exposure to victim impact evidence is to make the viewer more likely 
to impose a sentence of death. 
The effect of the victim impact evidence in enhancing the 
probability of a death sentence was not general nor was it based upon 
an overall favorable attitude toward police officers (the victim in this 
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case was a police officer), but was very specific to this particular case.  
Table 2 shows quite convincingly that those who viewed VIE were 
not more generally disposed to death even after viewing it, nor were 
they more generally disposed to police officers.  None of the 
relationships shown in Table 2 were statistically significant and the 
measures of gamma are all very weak.  While the victim impact 
evidence moved those who viewed it to impose a sentence of death on 
the particular offender in the case who caused the victim’s death, its 
effect was very targeted.  What follows are results which attempt to 
determine some of the intervening connections between potential 
jurors’ viewing of the victim impact evidence and their sentencing 
decision. 
First, there was a significant relationship between watching the 
victim impact testimony and emotional feelings of empathy and 
sympathy for the victim.  The overall mean for all subjects on our 
nine-item scale of empathy/sympathy for the victim and victim’s 
family was 24.911 (median = 27.00; std. dev. = 6.788; range from 12-
35).  For those subjects watching the victim impact evidence, 
however, the mean empathy/sympathy score was 30.486 (std. dev. = 
2.600), while the mean for those not viewing the VIE was only 18.540 
(std. dev. = 3.809). The independent samples t-test was 20.981, which 
was highly significant (p < .001).  Those who saw the VIE, then, were 
both substantially more likely to feel empathy and sympathy for the 
victim and the victim’s family, and were more likely to state that they 
would have voted for the death penalty if they had been a juror in the 
case.  Subjects who harbored feelings of empathy/sympathy for the 
victim and victim’s family were also significantly more likely to 
impose a death sentence than those who felt no such emotions. 
Since the independent variable in this relationship 
(empathy/sympathy scale) is continuous and the dependent variable is 
binary (vote for death vs. vote for life without parole/straight life) the 
association is not easy to capture.  One way to view this is to compare 
the mean level of empathy/sympathy for the death and non-death 
groups and build confidence intervals around each point estimate to 
see if they overlap.  For subjects who voted for a life or life without 
parole sentence, the mean level of empathy/sympathy was 22.278 and 
the 95% confidence interval around that point estimate was from 
20.783 to 23.774.  The mean empathy/sympathy level of those who 
would have voted for death was 28.625, and the 95% confidence 
interval was from 27.284 to 29.966.  These two confidence intervals do 
not overlap, suggesting that the mean level of empathy/sympathy is 
significantly different between the two groups at p < .05. 
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A slightly different approach that tells the same story is to 
estimate the “point biserial correlation coefficient” between the two 
variables.  It is 0.462 (p < .001), indicating that there is a significant 
positive relationship between feelings of empathy/sympathy and 
voting for the death penalty in this case.71  Thus far, two concerns 
expressed by a majority of the Court in Booth (and ignored by the 
majority in Payne) are borne out: Victim impact evidence seems to be 
emotionally arousing, heightening feelings of empathy and sympathy 
both for the victim and the victim’s family, and it increases the chance 
that the juror will vote for a death sentence. 
We now move to examine the important reasons expressed by 
the subjects for their sentencing decisions and the relationship 
between these reasons and which group they were in (the 
experimental group, who saw VIE, or the control group, who did 
not).  Subjects were asked how important the following reasons were 
in making their sentencing decision: the offender’s role or 
responsibility for the crime, the emotional loss and grief suffered by 
the victim’s family, the financial loss suffered by the victim’s family, 
sympathy for the family of the victim, and sympathy for the victim.  
Table 3 shows that large proportions of both the experimental and 
control group (about 90% of each group) thought that the offender’s 
role and responsibility for the murder was either very important or an 
important factor in their sentencing decision.  A much smaller, 
though roughly equal, proportion of both groups (approximately 
70%) thought that the financial loss suffered by the victim’s family 
was either a very important or an important factor in their sentencing 
decision.  What distinguishes the group that saw the victim impact 
evidence and those that did not is in terms of more emotional factors 
in their sentencing decision.  For example, while 53.9% of the control 
group reported that the emotional loss and grief suffered by the 
victim’s family was a very important or important factor in the 
decision to sentence the defendant, fully 95.8% of those who saw the 
VIE said that it was an important factor.  Similarly, of those who did 
not see the victim impact testimony, about 54% said that sympathy 
 
 71.  We also collapsed the continuous empathy/sympathy variable into various 
categories (at the median, into thirds, and quartiles) and built contingency tables.  In each 
case there was a significant positive gamma between the empathy/sympathy measure and 
voting for the death penalty (either as a binary variable or codes as death, life without 
parole and straight life).  Finally, we estimated a bivariate logistic regression model with 
death penalty vote as the dependent variable and the empathy/sympathy scale as the 
outcome variable.  The logistic regression coefficient for the empathy/sympathy scale was 
both positive and statistically significant.  
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for the victim’s family was a very important or important factor in 
deciding the appropriate sentence and about 57% said that sympathy 
for the victim was very important or important.  Among those who 
saw the VIE, however, 84.5% reported that sympathy for the victim’s 
family was either very important or important in deciding sentence 
and 87.5% reported that sympathy for the victim was either very 
important or important.  These differences between the groups are 
statistically significant and substantively large.  There is a very close 
relationship between viewing victim impact evidence in this case and 
reporting that emotional factors were important in deciding the 
sentence they would have voted for in the case—a consequence of 
VIE that was feared by the majority in Booth/Gathers and by the 
dissenters in Payne. 
There is one last view of the effect of victim impact evidence in 
this case that we can offer.  All subjects were asked, “How well is the 
victim’s family coping with the murder?” and “How much would a 
death sentence help the victim’s family find closure or help them 
recover from their loss?”  Recall that responses to both questions 
ranged on an eleven point continuum where 0 implied “coping 
well”/“no help” and 10 implied “coping poorly”/“a great help.”  First 
we will examine the relationship between which group a respondent 
belonged to (VIE/NoVIE) and their response to each of these 
questions. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the two group’s responses to 
the question how well the murder victim’s family was coping.  About 
55% of those who saw the victim impact testimony reported that the 
victim’s family was not coping well (in categories 9 or 10) while the 
corresponding percent for those who did not view the VIE was only 
about 14%.  A chi-square test was highly significant and the gamma 
was strong (χ2 = 39.795; p < .001; γ = .629).  Viewed differently, the 
mean response for the item was 7.90 for the experimental group (std. 
dev. = 2.308) while it was 5.35 for those not viewing the VIE (std. dev. 
= 2.695); and the t-test for the difference between means was t = 5.930 
(p < .001). 
Figure 3 shows the distribution across the eleven responses for 
the question how much a death sentence would help the victim’s 
family find closure or help them recover from their loss.  About 60% 
of those who saw the victim impact testimony thought that it would 
be a great help (in response categories 9 or 10) while only about 30% 
who did not see the VIE thought that a death sentence would be a 
great help (χ2 = 27.795; p < .001; γ = .461).  Those subjects who saw the 
victim impact evidence had a mean on this item of 8.93 while those 
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who did not had a mean of only 7.02 (t = 8.617’ p < .001). Clearly, 
compared with those who did not, those who saw victim impact 
evidence were more likely to think that if they were to impose a death 
sentence on the offender it would provide some measure of comfort 
for the murder victim’s family. 
Our final two research questions are these: (1) are subjects who 
thought that the victim’s family is not coping well with the crime more 
likely to impose a sentence of death than those who thought the 
family was coping better?; and (2) are subjects who believed that a 
death sentence would help the victim’s family find closure or help 
them recover more likely to impose a sentence of death?  We can 
answer both of these questions with a simple bivariate logistic 
regression analysis with the sentencing decision as the binary 
outcome variable (death/life) and each question as a separate 
explanatory variable.  The logistic regression coefficient for the 
coping question was b = .444 (p < .001) indicating that those subjects 
who thought that the victim’s family were not coping well with the 
crime were significantly more likely to say that they would have 
imposed a death sentence than those who thought that the victim’s 
family were coping better.  The magnitude of the coefficient is 
impressive.  An increase of one unit on the item corresponds to a 
56% increase in the odds of a death sentence.  The logistic regression 
coefficient for the closure question was b = .633 (p < .001), indicating 
that subjects who thought that a death sentence would help the 
victim’s family find closure or help them recover from their loss were 
significantly more likely to say that they would have voted for a death 
sentence in the case.  Again, the magnitude of this effect is 
impressive.  An increase of one unit on the item reflecting their belief 
in the family reaching closure with a death sentence increases the 
odds of a death sentence by 88%. 
VI.  Findings and Recommendations 
The collective thrust of our findings is that capital jurors are 
more likely to impose a death sentence in this case if they saw victim 
impact evidence that was presented by the victim’s sister to the jury 
than if they did not.  Those who saw the victim impact testimony were 
also more likely to say that they felt empathy and sympathy for the 
victim and the victim’s family.  The jurors in our study who felt such 
an emotional connection to the victim and family were relatively 
helpless with respect to what they could do to help.  They could, 
however, attempt to provide some assistance or comfort to the family 
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by imposing a death sentence on the offender.  The jurors in our 
study who saw the victim impact testimony were more likely to say 
that emotional considerations such as empathy and sympathy for the 
victim and victim’s family were important factors in their sentencing 
decision.  Those who saw the victim impact testimony were also more 
likely to think that the victim’s family was coping poorly with their 
loss and were more likely to think that a death sentence would give 
them closure and help them recover. These latter two emotional 
feelings were also important in increasing the probability that they 
would impose a sentence of death on the offender. 
Our findings suggest that victim impact evidence can create 
unfair prejudice to the accused that would substantially outweigh the 
probative value for which such evidence is offered, thereby requiring 
its exclusion.  In Payne, the Court said “there is no reason to treat 
such [victim impact] evidence differently than other evidence is 
treated.”72  We disagree.  Regardless of whether “death is different”73 
as a general proposition, victim impact evidence in capital cases—as 
our study suggests—is importantly different.  While many of the 
concerns about victim impact evidence discussed may apply equally 
to noncapital cases, they are especially problematic in the context of 
capital cases.  As our study has shown, the principle of fundamental 
fairness in a capital sentencing proceeding is violatedif the probative 
value of victim impact evidence is substantially outweighed by the 
danger that the defendant will be unfairly prejudiced by this 
evidence.74  It bears repeating that evidence is unfairly prejudicial only 
if it has an undue tendency to suggest decisions on an improper basis, 
commonly, though not always, an emotional one.75  It is unfairly 
 
 72.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1990).  
 73.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  For an excellent analysis of death-is-
different jurisprudence, see Jeffrey Abramson, Death is Different Jurisprudence and the 
Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2004). 
 74.  Justice O’Connor in Payne stated “We do not hold today that victim impact 
evidence must be admitted or even that it should be admitted.  We hold merely that if a 
State decides to permit consideration of this evidence, the Eighth Amendment erects no 
bar.  If in a particular case, a witness testimony or a prosecutor’s remark so infects the 
sentencing proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant may seek 
appropriate relief und the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  501 U.S. 
at 831 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (italics added).  Justice O’Connor specifically identified 
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment as the appropriate relief.  Justice Souter 
similarly acknowledged that “the trial judge’s authority and responsibility to control the 
proceedings consistently with due process, on which grounds the defendant may object 
and, if necessary, appeal.”  Id at 836 (Souter J., concurring). 
 75.  FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note. 
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prejudicial if it “appeals to the jury’s sympathy, arouses its sense of 
horror, provokes its instinct to punish” or otherwise may cause a jury 
to base its decision on something other than the established 
propositions in the case.76 
Our study produced several significant results that suggest the 
effects of victim impact evidence can create substantial unfairness to 
the defendant that would substantially outweigh its probative value 
sufficient to deny the defendant Due Process.  We found that jurors 
who watched victim impact evidence were more emotionally aroused 
than those who did not (See Figure 4).  Those who viewed the victim 
impact evidence were slightly more likely to feel “ashamed” than 
those who did not view it (30% vs. 21%).  Jurors who viewed the 
victim impact evidence were more likely to feel “upset” (49% vs. 
30%).  We also found that jurors who viewed victim impact evidence 
were substantially more likely to feel hostile (71% vs. 25%).  As can 
be seen in Figure 5, jurors who viewed victim impact evidence were 
significantly more likely to report that they felt “angry” (85% vs. 
24%).  Furthermore, we found that jurors who viewed victim impact 
evidence were significantly more likely to feel “vengeful” (77% vs. 
22%).  Subjects who viewed victim impact evidence also 
demonstrated raised primary emotions—emotions we feel and 
experience immediately after and in response to some event—and 
that, more importantly, raised primary emotions provide motivation 
for action.  As we hypothesized, we found that the motivation for 
action caused by watching victim impact evidence produced an 
arousal of feelings of sympathy and empathy for the victim and the 
victim’s family.  VIE also created a favorable view or disposition 
toward the victim and the victim’s family and an undesirable view or 
disposition toward the defendant 
In addition, we established that watching victim impact evidence 
aroused feelings of hostility, anger, and vengeance toward the 
offender.  Stated differently, we found evidence sufficient to support 
a finding that the victim impact evidence in our study created “an 
undue tendency to suggest decisions on an improper basis commonly, 
though not necessarily, an emotional one.77  This emotionalizing of the 
capital penalty phase brought on by VIE is to be contrasted with the 
juror’s rational and reasoned consideration of the background and 
characteristics of the offender and the circumstances of the crime 
 
 76.  See Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980); accord, Old Chief v. 
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). 
 77.  FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note.  
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before imposing sentence.  While it may be normal human nature for 
jurors to be moved by the obvious suffering and grieving of the family 
members of slain loved one—and to use the punishment available to 
them to strike a corresponding fatal blow to the defendant—Justice 
Marshall’s admonition that the 8th Amendment “is our insulation 
from our baser selves” is an apt reminder that the courts should not 
be used for private vengeance.78 
Does even the very low dose of victim impact evidence that was 
shown to the jurors in our study suggest unfair prejudice to the 
offender in that it appealed to the jury’s sympathy, aroused the jurors 
sense of horror, evoked feeling of anger and even caused them to seek 
vengeance primarily for the benefit of the victim’s family?  Did the 
victim impact evidence in our study provoke the jurors’ instinct to 
punish the offender to “help” do something for the victim’s family?  
Does the evidence from our study suggest other ways in which the 
jurors’ decisions were based on something other than the established 
propositions in the case?79  We believe that the answer to these 
questions is “Yes.”  Evidence of victim impact should be excluded 
whether it consists of a single piece of unfairly prejudicial evidence or 
the cumulative effect of elaborate evidence offered to create unfair 
prejudice. 
Mindful that capital cases are bifurcated, we challenge judges to 
apply the same safeguards during sentencing as they do during trial.  
We urge them to broaden the use of the rules of evidence, beyond 
relevance and Rule 403 considerations, to ensure that the evidence 
the jurors hear and consider during sentencing is sufficiently reliable 
and not unfairly prejudicial.  We further urge judges, when assessing 
the unfairly prejudicial impact of VIE under Rule 403, to consider the 
results of our study and take adequate steps to instruct jurors of its 
potential danger.  Lastly, we encourage judges to accept empirical 
evidence such as that produced in our study and offer it for the jury’s 
consideration.  Jurors having the daunting task of deciding life or 
death should be provided with the facts needed to inform their 
decision.  They should be made aware of the dangers of victim impact 
evidence and how it can improperly influence their decision.  Without 
adequate safeguards provided by the rules of evidence and proper 
instruction by the court, jurors identify with the victim and, as our 
study suggests, want to punish the defendant in order to help the 
 
 78.  Furman, 408 U.S. at 345 (Marshall, J. concurring). 
 79.  See Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980); accord, Old Chief v. 
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). 
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victim and the victim’s family.  We think it important and fair to 
jurors that they are properly informed of the potential effect VIE 
might have on their own decisions.  If they are not, much to their 
dismay, they might find themselves instruments of the defendant’s 
“particicution”80 not by their own hands, but by their uninformed 
minds.81 
We acknowledge that ours is but one study.  Nevertheless, we are 
confident in the significance of our findings.  We are confident as well 
in our belief that empirical evidence is needed to inform judges and, 
more important, the jurors who are called upon to decide whether the 
defendant will live or die.  The empirical evidence developed in our 
study is at least as reliable as the intuitions and anecdotal evidence 
 
 80.  Margaret Atwood, in her novel The Handmaid’s Tale, used “Particicution” to 
describe public executions at which spectators were permitted to participate in the 
execution of a wrongdoer with their own hands.   
 81.  We believe our statistical and evidentiary analyses highlight that VIE presents a 
very real danger of being unfairly prejudicial to criminal defendants, and that such unfairly 
prejudicial evidence is fundamentally unfair in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
14th Amendment.  We infer two possible ways to deal with this danger.  The first is to 
apply strictly the same evidentiary safeguards during sentencing that the defendant 
receives during the pretrial and trial phases.  If judges were to do that, they would be 
forced to deal with each of the evidentiary pitfalls that we have identified.  We would have 
to say that the greatest potential for substantial unfair prejudice comes in the form of 
improper character evidence.  As we discussed in our paper, during capital sentencing the 
defendant’s character is routinely attacked by the prosecution even though the defendant 
does not put his character in issue (Rule 404(a)) and even if he does not testify.  However, 
it becomes immediately apparent that improper character evidence is often admitted in 
the form of inadmissible hearsay (Rule 803).  In addition, the inadmissible hearsay 
character evidence may also involve improper lay and expert opinion testimony (Rule 
703).  Further, after all of this unfairly prejudicial VIE evidence is offered, the defendant is 
virtually powerless to attack it or what rights he does have are pro forma.  As we 
discussed, the defendant’s 6th Amendment right to cross-examine VIE witnesses is an 
empty right that the defendant dare not exercise.  The cumulative effect is a very real 
danger of unfairly prejudicial evidence against the defendant that substantially outweighs 
whatever probative value that VIE may have such that the defendant is deprived of the 
fundamental fairness that is guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.  The second way to deal 
with this danger and, we urge, the only rational way thing to do, is to recognize that VIE is 
inherently unfairly prejudicial to the defendant, that it is fundamentally unfair, that it 
deprives the defendant of Due Process as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment and 
therefore should be excluded with a per se rule. Whether there can ever be a 
constitutionally acceptable form of VIE is beyond the scope of our paper.  Whatever VIE 
should be, it is clear that under current sentencing schemes VIE has far exceeded its status 
purpose—to provide “a brief glimpse in the life of . . .”  We fear that capital defendants 
will likely continue to be sacrificed on the altar, and in the name, of “victim rights” and/or 
“closure for the victim’s family.”  We think that the Court in Booth and Gathers “got it 
right,” and that VIE should be prohibited.  Lastly, we would go further as we believe 
capital punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 8th 
Amendment and that it should be abolished. 
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upon which courts typically rely when making Rule 403 
determinations.  While we do not discount the value of such evidence, 
we are confident that empirical evidence is more reliable.  We urge 
judges to allow jurors to consider our finding and decide, as with any 
evidence they consider, what, if any, probative value to give to it. 
VII.  Conclusion 
The majority opinion in Payne argued that victim impact 
evidence is valuable testimony in informing capital sentencers of the 
full harm produced by the offender’s crime; that it was necessary to 
balance the evidence given the sentencer, since jurors could and did 
hear virtually unlimited evidence in mitigation on behalf of the 
defendant; that it would not likely be overly prejudicial since it would 
provide only a “quick glimpse of the life” taken by the offender; and 
if it was prejudicial in particular cases there were available remedies. 
In many cases it could be argued that victim impact evidence 
goes a bit further than simply providing a quick glimpse of the life 
that the offender extinguished.  In Kelly and Zamudio, the Court was 
confronted with victim impact evidence that was portrayed through a 
video display of the offenders’ lives and views of the victims’ graves, 
all with accompanying music.  The Court could have taken this 
opportunity to place some limits on either the form or content of 
victim impact evidence, but it denied hearing in the cases.  Perhaps it 
should have taken this opportunity.  In the case involved in this 
research, the victim impact evidence was neither as elaborate nor as 
well produced as those in Kelly and Zamudio.  The sister of the 
victim, a law enforcement officer, read the VIE from printed sheets of 
paper, which lasted no more than twenty minutes.  It had a profound 
effect, however, in making potential jurors feel empathy and 
sympathy for the victim and victim’s family, and our data are 
consistent with the conclusion that those who saw the victim impact 
evidence were more likely to state that these feelings for the victim 
and victim’s family were important considerations in what sentence 
they would have imposed.  We also know that subjects who saw the 
victim impact evidence were significantly more likely to state that the 
victim’s family was not coping well with the murder and that a death 
sentence would help them find closure on the issue. 
While informative, we do think our study has two important 
limitations.  First, we did not have our subjects deliberate and vote on 
a verdict.  Jury deliberation would have added length to an already 
demanding experiment for our subjects.  It would be important for 
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future research to consider building in deliberation and querying 
subjects about their sentencing vote both before and after 
deliberation.  Second, it would be important also to build into the 
experiment manipulations of the victim impact evidence (direct 
testimony of family members vs. nonfamily members; written versus 
personally delivered testimony; variations of video testimony by 
family members, etc.) to see if some types of victim impact evidence 
are received as more emotional by jurors, and how that would affect 
their verdict.  Finally, it would be important to build into the 
experiment instructions by the judge to see if even the most 
emotional and potentially unfairly prejudicial of VIE could be 
mitigated by judge’s instructions.82 
Our findings point to two important conclusions.  First, social 
science empirical research can be an important tool in informing the 
law.  The majority opinion in both Booth and Gathers held that VIE 
would have the unintended effect of making the penalty decision in a 
capital trial turn on jurors’ emotions rather than on their reasoned 
analysis of the law.  The majority opinion in Payne, the case that 
overturned these two previous decisions, was dismissive of those 
concerns.  Neither of these two camps appealed to social scientific 
evidence to help them understand what essentially was an empirical 
question, “What is the effect of letting jurors hear victim impact 
evidence?”  The weight of this social science evidence is now 
impressive. 
Second, our findings should raise alarms about the potentially 
unfairly prejudicial nature of victim impact evidence for the capital 
defendant.  We encourage judges to apply the rules of evidence 
during the capital sentencing phase of the trial to ensure that the 
evidence considered by the jurors when deciding whether one is to 
live or die is relevant, reliable and not unfairly prejudicial.  Even the 
unexceptional victim impact statement in our study had implications 
for what type of sentence the defendant received.  In the Booth 
decision, Justice Marshall was concerned that the decision to sentence 
a defendant to death may depend upon both the existence of 
someone to speak for the victim, and the eloquence of their voice.  
Our findings in this paper painfully suggest his concern may have 
substantial merit. 
 
 82.  See Judith Platania & Garrett L. Berman, The Moderating Effect of Judge’s 
Instructions on Victim Impact Testimony in Capital Cases, 2 APPLIED PSYCHOL. IN CRIM. 
JUST. 84 (2006). 
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Appendix A 
The case involved the shooting of a nonuniformed police officer 
outside a bar at approximately 2:00 a.m. one morning.  The officer 
had been in the bar that evening, drinking and socializing with 
friends. When he left the bar two of the three suspects (the third was 
waiting in a car) approached the officer and one of them started 
shooting.  The officer was shot nine times, with some entry wounds 
inflicted when the gun was from six inches to two feet away from the 
body.  The shooter was described by eyewitnesses as wearing a black 
puffy coat.  The two assailants ran from the scene, jumped into the 
awaiting car and fled.  A friend of the officer who was at the bar at 
the time of the shooting gets the officer’s gun and chases the suspects.  
When the suspects leave their car he fires the weapon at them and the 
suspects split up.  One suspect, the suspect in this case, hides in an 
outdoor toolshed but is seen by a witness and police officers surround 
the shed.  The suspect surrenders and officers find a 9mm Glock 
handgun in the shed.  Ballistics tests revealed chemical traces of 
gunpowder on the hand of the suspect and the Glock was the weapon 
that killed the officer.  The only aggravating circumstance in the 
offense is the fact that the suspect was a police officer.  In fact, the 
officer arrested a family member of one of the suspects six months 
previous to the officer’s murder, and this family member was 
sentenced to the penitentiary.  The prosecution claimed that this was 
a revenge killing, and that the offense is death eligible because the 
victim was a police officer.  The defense claimed that according to 
state statute the death penalty is a possible punishment only when a 
law enforcement officer was on duty, which was not the case here, 
since the officer was not in uniform, not working at the time, but at a 
bar on his own time.  The prosecution argued that city police officers 
are expected to be on-duty and respond to pleas for assistance at all 
times.  At trial the suspect pleaded innocent to the murder charge, 
claiming that he only drove the getaway car.  Witnesses were 
presented linking the suspect to the gun, and to being the one who 
actually fired the shots that killed the police officer. 
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Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Experimental (VIE)  
and Control (Non-VIE) Subjects* 
________________________________________________________
     VIE  No VIE 
     (n=72)  (n=63) 
Marital Status     
 Single    42%  39% 
 Married/Co-habitating  35%  37% 
 Divorced   15%  16% 
 Single      8%    8% 
 
Race 
 White    26%  24% 
 Non-White   74%  76% 
 
Gender  
 Male    31%  29% 
 Female    69%  71% 
 
Education 
 No High School  14%  18% 
 H.S. Graduate   42%  47% 
 Some College or Vocational 11%  10% 
 College Graduate  17%  12% 
 Graduate School  16%  13% 
 
Income 
 Less than $10,000  11%    8% 
 $10,000 - $19,999  13%  15% 
 $20,000 - $29,999  17%  19% 
 $30,000 - $39,999  20%  23% 
 $40,000 - $49,999  13%  11% 
 $50,000 - $59,999  13%  13% 
 $60,000 and over  13%  11% 
 
Age     48.7  47.5 
 
*  In all comparisons, p > .05 based either on chi-square or t-test. 
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